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I nt r oduct ion
If market s are complet e t hen consumers have common shadow prices { namely t he vect or of market prices. So shareholders agree t hat¯rms should maximize pro¯t s wit h respect t o t hese common prices. However, if market s are incomplet e, shadow prices need not be common. Thus, typically shareholders disagree on t he product ion plans t o be chosen. Therefore several suggest ions have been put forward as reasonable object ives for¯rms.
It seems nat ural t hat product ion plans should sat isfy t he Paret o crit erion: t here are no alt ernat ive product ion plans t hat make some shareholders bet t er o® and none worse o®. Unfort unat ely, t he Paret o crit erion is weak: product ion plans sat isfy t he Paret o crit erion if and only if t hey maximize pro¯t s wit h respect t o some price vect or in t he convex hull of t he shareholders' shadow prices.
Drµ eze (1974) and Grossman & Hart (1979) agree t hat product ion plans should sat isfy t he Paret o crit erion and propose t hat sidepayments between shareholders be allowed. Drµ eze (1974) (resp. Grossman & Hart (1979) ) suggests t hat product ion plans should re°ect preferences of¯nal (resp. init ial) shareholders: t his may be int erpret ed as product ion plans are det ermined after market s close (resp. before markets open). However, sidepayment s depend on informat ion t hat shareholders have incent ives t o manipulat e, a weakness t hat vot ing rules overcome.
Drµ eze (1985) suggest s t hat product ion plans should be st able for simple majority vot ing between shareholdersand unanimity between board members (wit hout sidepayments): t here is no alt ernat ive product ion plan t hat makes all board members aswell asa majority of shareholdersbet t er o®. Asin Drµ eze (1974) product ion plans re°ect preferences of¯nal shareholders. It appears t o be a drawback t hat unanimity between board members is essent ial for exist ence of equilibria. DeMarzo (1993) invest igat es some propert ies of equilibria where product ion plans are st able for simple majority vot ing between shareholders. Typi-cally t he largest shareholder det ermines t he product ion plan at t hese equilibria. Also, DeMarzo shows t hat st ability for simple majority vot ing between shareholders and unanimity between board members imply that board members determine t he product ion plan. However, as he argues, such equilibria need not exist unless eit her t he degree of market incomplet eness or t he dimension of t he set of e± cient product ion plans is 1.
In t he present paper, st ability wit h respect t o ½ -majority vot ing between shareholders is st udied: t here is no alt ernat ive product ion plan t hat makes more t han ½£ 100 percent of t he shareholders bet t er o®. Indeed, at a ½majority st able equilibrium (or ½ -MSE), consumers do not want t o change t heir port folios,¯rms are not able t o make more than ½£ 100 percent of t heir shareholders bet t er o® by changing product ion plans and¯nally, market s clear. It is shown t hat if port folios are unbounded t hen a ½ -MSE exist s provided t hat ½¸min ½ S ¡ J S ¡ J + 1 ; B B + 1 ¾ where S is t he number of st ates at t he last dat e, J is t he number of¯rms and B is t he dimension of t he set of e± cient product ion plans for¯rms. If portfolios are bounded t o be non-negat ive t hen a ½ -MSE exist s provided t hat ½¸B =(B + 1).
Di®erent t imings of trade and vot e are considered. Vot ing may t ake place while market s are open or aft er market s close, in which case¯nal shareholders vot e (as in Drµ eze (1985) and DeMarzo (1993) ). And it may t ake place before market s open, in which case init ial shareholders vot e. In case of voting before market s open or while t hey are open, shareholders need t o form expect at ions about price variat ions. Two types of price percept ions are considered: competitive price percept ions (as int roduced by Grossman & Hart (1979) ) and¯xed price percept ions. According t o compet it ive price percept ions consumers perceive t hat income vect ors are valued by t heir shadow prices; whereas according t o¯xed price percept ions t hey perceive t hat prices are not in°uenced by changes in product ion plans.
In general, changes of product ion plans in°uence t rading opportunit ies t hrough two channels: t hey change t he value of port folios as well as the span of asset s. From t his perspect ive, compet it iveprice percept ions and¯xed price percept ions represent two ext remes: consumers concent rat e on how changes of product ion plans change t he value of t heir port folios wit h t he former and t he span of asset s wit h t he lat t er.
In case market s are complete, a ½ -MSE exist s even for unanimity, i.e. wit h ½= 0. Ekern & Wilson (1974) have shown t hat t his result ext ends t o t he case of partial spanning, i.e. t he set s of e± cient product ion plans are subset s of t he span of asset s 1 . In case market s are incomplet e such t hat eit her t he degree of incomplet eness is 1 or the set s of e± cient product ion plans are 1-dimensional, a ½ -MSE exist s for simple majority voting, i.e. wit h ½ = 1=2, as argued by DeMarzo (1993) . It is shown here t hat in case of a more severe degree of incomplet eness and higher dimensions of t he set s of e± cient product ion plans, super majority rules (½> 1=2) are needed t o ensure exist ence of ½ -MSE.
The social choice lit erat ure o®ers some general result s on exist ence of st able equilibria under super majority vot ing { see, e.g., Ferejohn & Gret her (1974) , Greenberg (1979) , Caplin & Nalebu® (1988 , 1991 and Balasko & Crµ es (1997) . Crµ es (2000) exploit s t he result s of Caplin & Nalebu® (1988 , 1991 t o obt ain some condit ions on t he dist ribut ion of consumers' charact erist ics under which a ½ -MSE exist s for ½between 0.5 and 0.64 in a model wit h a cont inuum of consumers, rest rict ive assumpt ions on production set s and preferences of consumers. Here t he result of Greenberg (1979) is exploit ed t o obt ain a lower bound on t he rat e ½for which a ½ -MSE exist s, in a model wit h a¯nit e number of consumers, weak assumpt ions on product ions set s and preferences, and no assumpt ions on t he dist ribut ion of consumers' charact erist ics. A di± culty in applying t he result s from t he social choice lit erat ure is t hat preferences of shareholders, as well as shares (i.e. vot ing weight s), are endogeneously det ermined t hrough general equilibrium e®ect s.
Even t hough t he proposed bounds on ½ are quit e high and cannot be improved, as shown by an example, t he results of t he present paper show t hat : (1) t he degree of market incompleteness plays a fundament al role in rest rict ing t he dimension of t he set of alt ernat ives and thereby in aggregat ing preferences of shareholders and (2) t he lower t he degree of market incomplet eness t he lower super majority rat e is necessary t o ensure exist ence of a ½ -MSE.
The paper is organized as follows: in Sect ion 2 t he model is int roduced; in Sect ion 3 assumpt ions are st at ed, exist ence of a ½ -MSE, for ½¸minf (S ¡ J )=(S ¡ J + 1); B =(B + 1)g, is est ablished in case vot ing t akes place aft er market s close, and an example is given showing t hat t he lat t er bound cannot be improved; in Sect ion 4 price percept ions are int roduced and exist ence of a ½ -MSE is est ablished in case vot ing t akes place eit her before market s open or while t hey are open, and;¯nally Sect ion 5 cont ains some concluding remarks. All proofs are gat hered in an appendix.
T he model
Consider an economy wit h 2 dates, t 2 f 0; 1g, 1 stat e at t he¯rst dat e, s = 0, and S st ates at t he second dat e, s 2 f 1; : : : ; Sg. There are: 1 commodity at every st at e, I consumers, i 2 f 1; : : : ; I g, and J¯rms, j 2 f 1; : : : ; J g. Consumers are charact erized by t heir consumpt ion set s, X i ½ R S+ 1 , endowment s, ! i 2 R S+ 1 , preferences described by correspondences, P i : X i ! X i , and init ial portfolio of shares in¯rms, ± i 2 R J where P I i = 1 ± i j = 1 for all j . Firms are charact erized by t heir product ion set s, Y j ½ R S+ 1 .
Consumers choose consumpt ion plans, x i 2 X i , and port folios, µ i 2 R J . Firms choose product ion plans, y j 2 Y j . For convenience, let x = (x i ) I i = 1 , µ = (µ i ) I i = 1 , y = (y j ) J j = 1 , q = (q j ) J j = 1 2 R J where q j is the price of shares in ¯rm j , Y = (y 1 ¢¢¢ y J ) and
Wit h some abuse of not at ion, q j denot es t he price of shares in¯rm j as well as t he j 't h column of Q. The budget set of consumer i is B i (Q; Y ) = f x i 2 X i jx i · ! i + Q± i + (Y ¡ Q)µ i for some µ i 2 R J g and x i is a solut ion t o t he problem of consumer i provided that x i 2 B i (Q; Y ) and P i (x i ) \ B i (Q; Y ) = ; . Hence, t here are no st rat egic considerat ions involved in t he choices of port folios. Let U i j (x i ; µ i j ; y j ) denot e the set of product ion plans for¯rm j t hat make, at t he considered allocat ion (x; µ; y), consumer i bet t er o®, i.e. U i j (x i ; µ i j ; y j ) = f y 0 j 2 Y j jx i + (y 0 j ¡ y j )µ i j 2 P i (x i )g:
Next let u j (x; µ j ; y j ; y 0 j ) denot et heset of consumerswho are, at t heconsidered allocation (x; µ; y), bet t er o® wit h product ion plan y 0 j for¯rm j rat her t han y j , i.e. u j (x; µ j ; y j ; y 0 j ) = f i 2 f 1; : : : ; I gjy 0 j 2 U i j (x i ; µ i j ; y j )g: Then preferences of¯rms are described, for a¯xed rat e ½of t he super majority rule, by correspondences, P ½ j : ; for
And y j is a solut ion to t he problem of¯rm j provided t hat P ½ j (x; µ j ; y j ) \ Y j = ; . Thus, if the product ion plan is changed from y j t o y 0 j t hen t his change is dist ribut ed t o shareholders propot ionally t o t heir shares. 6 D e¯nit ion 1 (q ¤ ; x ¤ ; µ ¤ ; y ¤ ) is a ½ -maj or it y st able equili br ium provided that
for all j 2 J , and, ² markets clear, i.e.
for all j 2 J .
A ssumpt ions and exist ence of equilibr ium
Assumpt ions on consumers,¯rms and t he product ion sect or are imposed in order t o ensure t he exist ence of a ½ -majority st able equilibrium. Consumers are supposed t o sat isfy t he following assumpt ions
Assumpt ions (a.1) and (a.2) imply t hat consumpt ion set s are unbounded as considered by Balasko (1988) while assumpt ions (a.3), (a.4), (a.5) and (a.6) are generalizat ions of equivalent assumpt ions considered by Balasko (1988) t o non-t ransit ive, non-complet e and non-di®erent iable preferences. Assumpt ions (a.3) and (a.4) are st andard cont inuity and monot onicity assumpt ions; assumpt ion (a.5) st at es exist ence of a unique shadow price vect or ¹ i (x i ) at each consumpt ion bundle x i , and; assumpt ion (a.6) generalizes t he st andard \ boundedness from below" property of indi®erence sets t o t he present framework where preferences are not necessarily t ransit ive nor complet e. Let Z j ½ R S+ 1 be t he set of e± cient product ion plans, i.e.
Z j = f y j 2 R S+ 1 j(f y j g + R S+ 1 + ) \ Y j = f y j gg t hen¯rms are supposed t o sat isfy t he following assumpt ions (a.7) t he product ion set, Y j , is convex and closed, and, (a.8) t here exist s a compact and B -dimensional a± ne set , B j ½ R S+ 1 , such t hat Z j ½ B j .
Assumpt ion (a.7) is st andard while assumpt ion (a.8) includes \ t runcated" product ion set s such as f y 2 R S+ 1 jy 0 2 [y; 0] and y s · (y 0 ) b for all s 2 f 1; : : : ; Sgg where y · 0 and b 2 ]0; 1]. Moreover, t he product ion sect or of t he economy is supposed t o sat isfy t he following assumpt ion 8 (a.9) product ion plans for dat e 1, ((y s j ) S s= 1 ) J j = 1 , are linearly independent for all product ion plans in t he convex hull of t he closure of t he set of e± cient production plans, y j 2 co cl Z j for all j .
Assumpt ion (a.9) excludes t hat¯rms are able t o replicat e product ion plans of each ot her.
T heor em 1 There exists a ½ -majority stable equilibrium for all economies which satisfy assumptions (a.1) to (a.9) if and and only if
Remark: The argument t o est ablish t he \ if" of t he assert ion is based on t he proofs of Theorem 2 in Greenberg (1979) and t he t heorem in Shafer & Sonnenschein (1975) . A generalized game is const ruct ed where, among ot her const ruct ions,¯rms det ermine product ion plans t hat maximize pro¯t s wit h respect t o prices which re°ect int erest s of t heir shareholders and groups of shareholders (one per¯rm) det ermine prices for which¯rms maximizepro¯t s. Hence, t he original problem of t he¯rm { which is t o¯nd a product ion plan for which no alt ernat ive product ion plan can be support ed by a ½ -majority of it s shareholders { is decomposed int o pro¯t maximizat ion wit h respect t ō rm speci¯c prices and det erminat ion of¯rm speci¯c prices wit h respect t o some art i¯cial preferences for it s shareholders.
The argument t o est ablish t he \ only if" of t he assert ion is based on t he const ruct ion of an economy for which no ½ -majority st able equilibrium wit h ½< minf (S ¡ J )=(S ¡ J + 1); B =(B + 1)g exist s.
End of remark
In case S¡ J = 1, Theorem 1 ensures exist ence of a simple majority st able equilibrium. It is easily seen t hat t he prices for which¯rms maximize pro¯t s are, in t his case, typically not the ones Drµ eze (1974) suggest s. Indeed, in t heorem 1 the shadow price vect or of t he median shareholder is used whereas Drµ eze (1974) suggests t hat t he average shadow price vect or should be used.
Trading on t he¯nancial market s, when consumers are not const rained in t heir portfolio choices, leads t o suit able normalized shadow prices being contained in some (S¡ J )-dimensional a± ne set (hY ¤ ¡ Q ¤ i ? \ ¢ S + ). However, if t here are rest rict ions on port folios, like short sales const raint s, t hen t he degree of market incomplet eness need not rest rict shadow prices.
Cor ollar y 1 Suppose that portfolios are bounded such that µ i 2 [0; 1] J for all i and that co cl Z j ½ R S+ 1 + for all j . Then there exists a ½ -majority stable equilibrium provided that ½¸B B + 1 :
It is hard t o love t he assumpt ion t hat co cl Z j ½ R S+ 1 + for all j . However, t he \ Cass-t rick" { one consumer t rades on complet e market s { cannot be applied in corollary 1 because port folios are bounded t o be between 0 and 1. Therefore exist ence of equilibrium is only ensured provided t hat prices of shares are posit ive as explained by Radner (1972) and the assumpt ion ensures t his.
Pr ice per cept ions
In t hepresent sect ion di®erent t imings between t radeand vot eareconsidered. At a ½ -majority st ableequilibrium, (q ¤ ; x ¤ ; µ ¤ ; y ¤ ), if consumer i considers how t o vot ewit h regard t o a changefrom (q ¤ j ; y ¤ j ) t o (q j ; y j ) of priceand product ion plan for¯rm j (where ± i j > 0 or µ ¤ i j > 0 because ot herwise consumer i have no vot ing weight ) t hen ² in case vot ing t akes place aft er market s close, she vot es for t he change if and only if 
for some µ i , and, ² in case vot ing takes place before market s open, she vot es for t he change if and only if
for some µ i (here t he vot ing weight s are ± + j ).
If port folios are unbounded, i.e. µ i 2 R J , t hen ¹ i (x ¤ i ) 2 hY ¤ ¡ Q ¤ i ? at a ½ -majority st able equilibrium, (q ¤ ; x ¤ ; µ ¤ ; y ¤ ). Therefore in case vot ing t akes place after market s close (resp. while market s are open or before t hey open), if consumer i vot es for t he change t hen ¹ 4.1 Com pet it ive pr ice p er cept ions Grossman & Hart (1979) Cor ollar y 3 Suppose that portfolios are bounded such that µ i 2 [0; 1] J for all i , that co cl Z j ½ R S+ 1 + for all j and that consumers have¯xed price perceptions. Then a ½ -majority stable equilibrium exists provided that ½¸B B + 1 :
Final r emar ks
In t he present paper, bounds on ½are provided such t hat ½ -majority st able equilibria exist . To complement t hese result s on exist ence of equilibrium it would be nice st udy: (1) t he e± ciency propert ies of equilibrium allocat ions, and;
(2) t he \ size" of t he set of equilibria.
On t he one hand, in many count ries, simple majority vot ing is used in assemblies of shareholders. On t he ot her hand, t he provided bounds on ½ implies t hat simple majority stable equilibria need not exist unless eit her t he degree of incomplet eness is 1 or the set s of e± cient product ion plans are 1-dimensional. Therefore it would be int erest ing t o¯nd \ reasonable" assumpt ions on product ion set s and preferences of consumers t hat ensure exist ence of ½ -majority st able equilibria for lower values of ½ .
Par t 1: ½¸(S ¡ J )=(S ¡ J + 1)
The variables t o be det ermined are st at e prices,¸2 ¢ S + , consumpt ion bundles for consumers, x = (x i ) I i = 1 ½ Q I i = 1 X i , product ion plans for¯rms, y = (y j ) J j = 1 ½ Q J j = 1 Y j , and prices wit h respect t o which¯rms maximize pro¯t s, º = (º j ) J j = 1 2 Q J j = 1 ¢ S + . The auct ioneer (agent 0) det ermines st at e prices in order t o maximize t he value of excess demand. Consumers (agent k 2 f 1; : : : ; I g) det ermine maximal consumpt ion bundles for their preferences. Firms (agent k 2 f I + 1; : : : ; I + J g) det ermine product ion plans t hat maximize pro¯t s wit h respect t o prices which re°ect int erest s of t heir shareholders. Groups of shareholders (agent k 2 f I + J + 1; : : : ; I + 2J g, one group per¯rm) det ermine prices for which¯rms maximize pro¯t s. Hence, t he original problem of t he¯rm { which is t o¯nd a product ion plan for which no alt ernat ive product ion can be support ed by a ½ -majority of it s shareholders { is decomposed int o pro¯t maximizat ion wit h respect t o¯rm speci¯c prices and det erminat ion of¯rm speci¯c prices wit h respect t o some art i¯cial preferences for it s shareholders.
In a¯rst st ep, t hese four cat egories of agent s (auct ioneer, consumers, rms and groups of shareholders) are described. In a second st ep, a suit able correspondence is const ruct ed and Kakutani's¯xed point t heorem is applied. Finally, in a t hird st ep, t he¯xed point is shown to be a ½ -majority st able equilibrium.
St ep 1: description of agents \ Auctioneer" For agent k = 0, t he st rat egy set , V k ½ R S+ 1 , is de¯ned by
where n 2 N , t he const raint correspondence, C k : V ! V k (where V is t he product of t he agent s' st rat egy set s, t o be de¯ned in t he sequel), is de¯ned by C k (¸; x; y; º ) = V k and t he preference correspondence, Q k : V ! V k , is de¯ned by
Clearly, V k is compact and convex, C k is cont inuous and gr Q k is open wit ḩ = 2 co Q k (¸; x; y; º ). \ Consumers" For agent k 2 f 1; : : : ; I g, the st rat egy set , V k ½ X i where i = k, is de¯ned by
where n 2 N , t he const raint correspondence, C k : V ! V k , is de¯ned by
for k = 1 where q j = (1=¸0)¸¢y j for all j and Proof: \ gr Q k is open" Suppose that (x i (n)) t2 N 2 V i converges t o x i 2 V i and t hat (¹ i (x i (n))) t2 N 2 ¢ S + converges to ¹ i 6 = ¹ i (x i ) 2 ¢ S + . Then t here exist s x 0 i 2 P i (x i ) such t hat ¹ i ¢(x 0 i ¡ x i ) · 0 so t here exist s x 00 i 2 P i (x i ) such t hat ¹ i ¢(x 00 i ¡ x i ) < 0. Therefore t here exist s N 2 N such t hat if n¸N t hen º i (x i (n)) ¢(x 00 i ¡ x i (n)) < 0 and x 00 i 2 P i (x i (n)) according t o (a.3). This is a contradict ion t hus ¹ i : Clearly, º j = 2 co (F i (º j ; x i ) \ C k (¸; x; y; º )) due t o t he const ruction of F i : ¢ S + £ V i ! ¢ S + t herefore º j = 2 co (R j \ C k (¸; x; y; º )) for all m because dim C k (¸; x; y; º ) = S ¡ J and ½¸(S ¡ J )=(S ¡ J + 1) hence º j = 2 co (Q k (¸; x; y; º ) \ C k (¸; x; y; º )) according t o Greenberg (1979) . 
St ep 3: existence of ½ -majority stable equilibrium
For consumers, t here exist s x i (f ! i g + P j ± i j co cl Z j ) 2 R S+ 1 such t hat if x i 2 B i (Q; Y ) and P i (x i ) \ B i (Q; Y ) = ; t hen x i¸xi (f ! i g + P j ± i j co cl Z j ) according t o (a.6) because f ! i g+ P j ± i j co cl Z j is compact according t o (a.7). Therefore t here exist z ¤ 2 h(z ¤ ) and N C 2 N such t hat if n¸N C -recall t hat V k = X i \ (f ! i g+ P j ± i j co cl Z j + [¡ n; n] S+ 1 ) for k = i -t hen x ¤ i 2 B i (Q ¤ ; Y ¤ ) and co P i (
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For consumers, if¸(n) !¸where¸s(n)¸1=n and¸s = 0 for s 2 S 0 ½ S and x 1 (n) 2 C 1 (¸(n); x(n); y(n); º (n)) and Q 1 (¸(n); x(n); y(n); º (n)) \ C 1 (¸(n); x(n); y(n); º (n)) = ; t hen P s2 S 0 x s 1 (n) ! 1 according t o (a.3) and (a.4) while consumpt ion is bounded from below for all consumers according t o (a.6). Therefore, for t he auct ioneer, t here exist s N A 2 N such t hat if n¸N A -recall t hat V k = ¢ S + \ [1=n; 1] S+ 1 for k = 0 -and z ¤ 2 h(z ¤ ) t hen . Thus, hv j i ? separat es H j (v j ) from t he rest of t he i 's in t he sense t hat H j (v j ) is above hv j i ? while t he rest of t he i 's are below or on hv j i ? , i.e. i 2 H j (v j ) if and only if ¹ i (x ¤ i ) ¢v j > 0. For v j 2 hº ¤ j i ? suppose t hat P s v s j < 1 wit hout loss of generality and let (p(n)) n2 N 2 ¢ where ¢ = f¸2 R S+ 1 j P s¸s = 1g be de¯ned by
for all n t hen (p(n)) n2 N converges t o º ¤ j . Let (q(n)) n2 N 2 hp(n) + º ¤ j i ? be de¯ned by
for all n. Then some t edious calculat ions show t hat (nq(n)) n2 N converges t o v j and hq(n)i ? separat es G j (º ¤ j ; x ¤ ; p(n)) from t he rest of t he i 's in t he sense t hat G j (º ¤ j ; x ¤ ; p(n)) is above hq(n)i ? while t he rest of t he i 's are below or on hq(n)i ? . Moreover t here exist s N 2 N such t hat if n¸N t hen hv j i ? separat es G j (º ¤ j ; x ¤ ; p(n)) from t he rest of t he i 's in t he sense t hat G j (º ¤ j ; x ¤ ; p(n)) is above hv j i ? while the rest of t he i 's are below or on hv j i ? . Thus if n¸N t hen G j (º ¤ j ; x ¤ ; p(n)) = H j (v j ). Therefore, P ½ j (x ¤ ; µ ¤ j ; y ¤ j ) = ; because Q I + J + j (z ¤ ) = ; .
Q.E.D.
For shareholders, if z ¤ 2 h I + J + j (z ¤ ) t hen P ½ j (x ¤ ; µ ¤ j ; y ¤ j ) = ; provided t hat n¸N C according t o lemma 2. Thus, if ½¸(S ¡ J )=(S ¡ J + 1) and n¸maxf N A ; N C g t hen a ½ -majority st able equilibrium exist s.
Par t 2: ½¸B =(B + 1)
The variables t o be det ermined are st at e prices,¸2 ¢ S + , consumpt ion bundles for consumers, x = (x i ) I i = 1 ½ Q I i = 1 X i , and product ion plans for¯rms, y = (y j ) J j = 1 ½ Q J j = 1 Y j . Let st rat egy sets, const raint correspondences and preference correspondences be de¯ned as in part 1 of t he proof for k 2 f 0; 1; : : : ; I g.
\ Firms" For agent k 2 f I + 1; : : : ; I + J g, t he st rat egy set , V k ½ R S+ 1 , is de¯ned by V k = co cl Z j where j = k ¡ I , t he const raint correspondence, C k : V ! V k , is de¯ned by C k (¸; x; y; ) = V k and t he preference correspondence, Q k : V ! V k , is de¯ned by Q k (¸; x; y) = P ½ j (x;´j (¸; x; y); y j ) \ V k :
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Clearly, V k is compact and convex, C k is cont inuous and gr Q k is open wit h y j = 2 co Q k (¸; x; y) for j = k ¡ I according t o t he proof of t heorem 2 in Greenberg (1979) .
The rest of t he proof follows from part 1. Thus, if ½¸B =(B + 1) t hen a ½ -majority st able equilibrium exist s.
Par t 3: an example showing that the bound is binding
Consider an economy wit h S consumers wit h ut ility functions linear in period zero consumpt ion and log-linear in period 1 consumption. Consumer i is indexed by weight s, ¼ i = (¼ s i ) S s= 1 wit h P S s= 1 ¼ s i = 1, on consumpt ion in di®erent st at es. The ut ility funct ion of consumer i is:
where " 2 ]0; 1 ¡ 1=(S ¡ 1)[ is small. Alt hough these ut ility funct ions do not sat isfy assumpt ion (a.6), since t he argument is local they can be easily ext ended out side t he relevant domain t o ful¯ll t his assumpt ion. All consumers are endowed wit h ident ical init ial shares of t he J¯rms: ± i j = 1=S, for all i ; j , and t he same vector of init ial resources: Next , de¯neỹ = (ỹ j ) J j = 1 such t hatỹ J = y J andỹ j = ®y j + (1 ¡ ®)y J for j · J ¡ 1, wit h ® = J=S. Let , for all j , Z j = Y \ B(ỹ j ; º ) where B(ỹ j ; º ) st ands for t he ball wit h cent erỹ j and radius º . This way, an (" ; º )-economy is de¯ned.
Obser vat ion 1 For all´, there exists (" ; º ) such that the (" ; º )-economy does not have a ½ -majority stable equilibrium for ½< (S ¡ J )=(S ¡ J + 1) ¡´.
Consider t he (" ; 0)-economy. It is now shown t hat t here is a unique ½majority st able equilibrium (for all ½ since º = 0 implies t here is no alt ernat ive product ion plan), (q ¤ ; µ ¤ ; y ¤ ), wit h y ¤ =ỹ and q ¤ =¯1 J wherē = S=J ¡ 1. For t he announced product ion plans y ¤ , t he expression of t he ut ility level of agent i buying, at price q ¤ , t he port folio (µ i j ) J j = 1 is: First -order condit ions of t his maximizat ion problem (opt imal port folio choice) gives: 8s · J ¡ 1 :
which in t urn yields: 8s · J ¡ 1 : µ i s = ¼ s i ®(¯+ 1) ; and µ i J =
It is easily checked t hat stock market s clear, as well as market s for good, for t he chosen values of ® = J=S and under t he equilibrium price¯= S=J ¡ 1. Then t he equilibrium port folio is:
which is such t hat J X j = 1 µ ¤ i j = J S for all i .
Suppose now t hat¯rm J is given t he opport unity t o propose a small change of it s product ion plan. For " small enough, one has µ ¤ i J > 0 for J · i · S and µ ¤ i J < 0 for 0 · i · J ¡ 1. Hence, only t he S ¡ J + 1 last consumers have a posit ive quant ity of shares in¯rm J and consequent ly t hey are t he only ones t o vot e, wit h t he same vot ing weight s. The ut ility funct ion of consumer i , J · i · S, has been const ruct ed such t hat , at t his symmet ric equilibrium, consumer i support s a (t echnically possible) change from y J t o y 0 J in Z J if and only if y i J · y 0i J , i.e. any change that yields more in st ate i . For example, y 0 J = y J + (0; : : : ; 0; ¡ " ; "=(S ¡ J ); : : : ; " =(S ¡ J )) get s t he support of t he last S¡ J shareholders/ shares. Hence, (q ¤ ; µ ¤ ; y ¤ ) is not st able for any super majority rule of size smaller t han (S ¡ J )=(S ¡ J + 1). Subject t o t he obvious upper hemi-cont inuity of t he equilibrium correspondence in t he present set up, any ½ -majority st able equilibrium of t he (" ; º )-economy, for " and º small enough, is such that ½> (S ¡ J )=(S ¡ J + 1) ¡´. Finally, not e t hat S ¡ J · B = S ¡ 1 so t here is no need t o consider t he ot her case which is more obvious.
P r oof of Cor ollar y 1
The variables t o be det ermined are prices, p 2 ¢ J + , consumpt ion bundles for consumers, x = (x i ) I i = 1 ½ Q I i = 1 X i , and product ion plans for¯rms, y = (y j ) J j = 1 ½ Q J j = 1 Y j . \ Auctioneer" For agent k = 0, t he st rat egy set, V k ½ R J + 1 , is de¯ned by for all i . Clearly, V k is compact and convex, C k is cont inuous and gr Q k is open wit h p = 2 co Q k (p; x; y). \ Consumers" As in part 1 in t he proof of t heorem 1 -rest rict ing port folios t o [0; 1] J and disregarding º .
\ Firms" As in part 2 in t he proof of t heorem 1 -rest rict ing port folios t o [0; 1] J in t he de¯nit ion of P ½ j (x; µ j ; y j ), replacing µ j wit h´j (p; x; y) and disregarding º .
The rest of t he proof follows from t he last part of part 1 in t he proof t heorem 1.
P r oof of Cor ollar y 3
Proof: Follows from t he proof of Theorem 1 wit h minor changes provided t hat x i 2B i (Q; Y ) and P i (x i ) \B i (Q; Y ) imply t hat y j 6 = coŨ i j (q; x i ; y j ).
Hence, suppose t hat (y j (n)) N n= 1 2Ũ i j (q; x i ; y) where N 2 N t hen t here exist s (µ i (n)) N n= 1 such t hat x i + (Y jy j (n) ¡ Q)µ i (n) 2 P i (x i ) for all n 2 f 1; : : : ; ng. Suppose t hat y 0 j = P n ®(n)y j (n) where ®(n)¸0 for all n and 26 P n ®(n) = 1 and let µ 0 j and (¯(n)) N n= 1 where¯(n)¸0 for all n and P n¯( n) = 1 be de¯ned by ®(n)µ 0 i j =¯(n)µ i j (n) for all n and µ 0 i j 0 = P n¯( n)µ i j 0(n) for all j 0 6 = j . Then x i + (Y jy 0 j ¡ Q)µ 0 i = N X n= 1¯( n)(x i + (Y jy j (n) ¡ Q)µ i (n)):
Therefore, if x i 2B i (Q; Y ) and P i (x i ) \B i (Q; Y ) t hen y j = 2 coŨ i j (q; x i ; y j ). It is necessary t o bound port folios t o be non-negative in order t o ensure t hat t here exist s µ 0 i and (¯(n)) n such t hat (Y jy 0 j ¡ Q)µ 0 i = P n¯( n)(Y jy j (n) ¡ Q)µ i (n).
